Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 75 | Issue 3

Article 6

2010

Unscrambling the Organic Eggs: The Growing
Divergence Between the DOJ and the FTC in
Merger Review After Whole Foods
Raymond Z. Ling

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
Raymond Z. Ling, Unscrambling the Organic Eggs: The Growing Divergence Between the DOJ and the FTC in Merger Review After Whole
Foods, 75 Brook. L. Rev. (2010).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol75/iss3/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

Unscrambling the Organic Eggs
THE GROWING DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE DOJ AND
THE FTC IN MERGER REVIEW AFTER WHOLE FOODS
INTRODUCTION
When the merger between Whole Foods Market Inc.
(“Whole Foods”) and Wild Oats Markets, Inc. (“Wild Oats”) was
first announced in 2007, few people suspected that this $565
million merger would set off such a massive (organic) food
fight, forcing the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and the judiciary to re-evaluate
their roles in the merger process.1 On March 6, 2009, Whole
Foods and the FTC announced a settlement.2 The tortuous legal
battle between the FTC and Whole Foods might be over, but
the most important result of the battle is not the settlement
between the FTC and Whole Foods. Rather, it is the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals’ controversial decision in FTC v.
Whole Foods Market, Inc., which articulated a preliminary
injunction standard making it much easier for the FTC to block
future mergers, compared to its antitrust enforcement
counterpart at the DOJ.3 In a system of shared responsibility
for enforcement of the federal antitrust laws, such an outcome
is unacceptable. Merging parties should expect the same
treatment and burden in the merger review process. The
substantive outcome of a proposed merger should not depend
on the arbitrary allocation of the merger to either the FTC or
the DOJ for review. However, after Whole Foods, the outcome
of a proposed transaction might very well depend on which
antitrust enforcement agency is reviewing it.
1

See Andrew Martin, Whole Foods Makes Offer for a Smaller Rival, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, at C1. The deal was a tender offer for all of Wild Oats stock at a
price of $18.50 per share—a 23% premium over the average share price in January of
2007. Id.
2
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Consent Order Settles Charges
that Whole Foods’ Acquisition of Rival Wild Oats was Anticompetitive (March 6, 2009),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/03/wholefoods.shtm.
3
548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008), amended and reissued, 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C.
Cir. 2008).
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In Whole Foods, the FTC sought a preliminary
injunction to stop the proposed merger of two organic
supermarkets, Whole Foods and Wild Oats.4 The FTC argued
that Whole Foods and Wild Oats were the two largest
competitors in the “premium, natural, and organic
supermarkets” or “PNOS” market and a merger of the two
companies would harm consumers by reducing competition in a
number of geographic markets.5 The D.C. District Court
rejected the FTC’s argument that PNOS were a distinct market
and concluded that a merger of Whole Foods and Wild Oats
would not substantially lessen competition in the broad market
of all supermarkets.6 Nearly a full year after the closing of the
merger and the integration of the two firms,7 a panel of D.C.
Circuit judges (Judge Brown, Judge Tatel, and Judge
Kavanaugh) issued three separate opinions reversing the
denial of the preliminary injunction.8 In Whole Foods, the D.C.
Circuit explicitly articulated a standard that significantly
reduces the FTC’s burden of proof in its request for preliminary
injunctions. This lowered preliminary injunction standard, and
the ability of the FTC to commence administrative proceedings,
create a disturbing perception that the outcome of a challenged
merger depends on which agency is reviewing the merger,
rather than on the antitrust merits of the case.
The effect of the Whole Foods decision has already been
felt. Less than a week after Whole Foods and the FTC settled, a
$1.4 billion merger between CCC Holdings, Inc., (“CCC
Holdings”) and Mitchell International, Inc., (“Mitchell
International”) was abandoned after a judge relied on Whole
4

Preliminary injunctions are used by the antitrust enforcement agencies to
“preserve the status quo by preventing the consummation of a merger.” AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MERGER AND ACQUISITIONS:
UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES 546 (3d. ed. 2008) [hereinafter
UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES]. Normally, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief
must prove: (1) irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted, (2) this injury
outweighs any harm to the defendant by the injunction, (3) the plaintiff has a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and (4) the injunction is in the public
interest. Id. at 564-65. For a more in depth discussion for each of the different factors,
see id. at 570-95.
5
Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1032.
6
FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1, 49-50 (D.D.C. 2007),
rev’d., 533 F.3d 869 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
7
See Alicia Wallace, Boulder’s Whole Foods-Wild Oats: One Year Later,
BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, Aug. 25, 2008, at D1. There were significant changes in
personnel, suppliers, distribution systems, and leasing agreements. Id.
8
FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt, Inc., 533 F.3d 869 (D.C. Cir. 2008), reprinted as
amended, 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

2010]

UNSCRAMBLING THE ORGANIC EGGS

937

Foods to issue a preliminary injunction that stopped the
proposed transaction.9 In November 2008, the three-judge
panel had amended and reissued its original opinions in Whole
Foods, so that Judge Tatel no longer concurred in Judge
Brown’s opinion, but rather only with the judgment of the
court.10 As a result of Judge Tatel’s revision, Judge Brown’s
opinion was no longer the majority opinion of the court and
there were questions about the precedential value of the
decision.11 However, FTC v. CCC Holdings, Inc. made it clear
that Whole Foods and its articulation of the preliminary
injunction standard for the FTC was now binding precedent.12
In a system where the DOJ and the FTC have shared
responsibility for enforcement of the federal antitrust laws,
merging parties should expect comparable treatment and
burden, as well as a comparable outcome, regardless of
whether the FTC or the DOJ is reviewing their merger.13
Antitrust enforcement has an enormous impact on the
economy, so consistency, predictability, and fairness are crucial
in the merger review process. However, the settlement between
the FTC and Whole Foods after a prolonged and expensive
fight, and the termination of the proposed merger between
CCC Holdings and Mitchell International, provide disturbing
illustrations that the choice of enforcement agency for merger
review clearly does influence the outcome of a transaction. In
light of Whole Foods, the best outcome for parties to a proposed
merger would be for the DOJ to clear the proposed transaction.
This Note will address the growing divergence in
merger enforcement between the FTC and the DOJ. It argues
9

See FTC v. CCC Holdings, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 (D.D.C. 2009). On
March 9, 2009, Judge Collyer granted the FTC’s request for a preliminary injunction.
On March 11, 2009, the parties announced the termination of the merger. See Press
Release, CCC Information Services Inc., CCC-Mitchell mutually agree to terminate
merger (March 11, 2009), available at http://ccc.cccis.com/filebin/pdf/CCCMITCHELL
Nonpursuit.pdf.
10
Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1028.
11
See id. at 1061 n.8 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). According to Judge
Kavanaugh, “this confused decision will invite years of uncertainty and litigation over
what the holding of this case is-a separate but important problem with the Court’s
approach.” Id.
12
See FTC v. CCC Holdings, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 36. According to Judge
Collyer, “precedents irrefutably teach that in this context ‘likelihood of success on the
merits’ has a less substantial meaning than in other preliminary injunction cases.
Heinz not only emphasized this point but Whole Foods makes clear that Heinz remains
good law.” Id. at 36 n.11.
13
See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
129 (2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc
_final_report.pdf [hereinafter ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT].
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that the FTC’s lower preliminary injunction standard and its
ability to commence administrative litigation gives the FTC a
significant advantage over the DOJ in challenging a merger
and extracting a settlement, a result that is unacceptable in a
dual enforcement system. Specifically, the Note argues that
after Whole Foods, the ultimate decision as to whether a
merger may proceed depends on which agency is reviewing the
transaction, which can lead to both expensive litigation and
disruptive post-closing divestitures. Part I examines the
relevant antitrust statutes, the enforcement agencies involved,
and how the merger review process works. Part II reviews the
history of the FTC’s challenge to the merger between Whole
Foods and Wild Oats. It begins with a discussion of the merger,
followed by a discussion of the district court and the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals’ decisions. It concludes with a review
of the settlement between the FTC and Whole Foods. Part III
discusses how the divergence in preliminary injunction
standards applicable to the DOJ and the FTC, and the ability
of the FTC to pursue administrative trials, produce
inconsistent results between the FTC and the DOJ in merger
enforcement. This Part argues that due to these divergences,
the choice of which antitrust enforcement agency is to review a
proposed merger is outcome-determinative.14 Finally, Part IV
suggests two approaches to harmonizing the divergences: a
judicial solution and a legislative solution. It argues that in
light of CCC Holdings, Inc., a judicial solution is unlikely, so
the most politically promising solution to stem the growing
divergence between the DOJ and the FTC enforcement
standards is for Congress to amend the Federal Trade
Commission Act to specify that the same preliminary
injunction standard applies to both enforcement agencies.

14

See American Bar Association, Public Comments Submitted to AMC
Regarding Government Enforcement Institutions: Differential Merger Enforcement
Standards, at 9 (Oct. 28, 2005), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/
public_studies_fr28902/enforcement_pdf/051028_ABA_Fed_Enforc_Inst_Differential_S
tandards.pdf [hereinafter ABA Comments re Differential Standards].
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THE PROCESS OF MERGER REVIEW BY THE DOJ AND THE
FTC

The DOJ’s Antitrust Division and the FTC have shared
responsibility for enforcement of the federal antitrust laws.15 To
avoid duplication of effort, the agencies consult with one
another and a proposed transaction is “cleared” to one agency
or the other for review in a process known as the “clearance
process.”16 This Part examines how the dual enforcement
system functions. It begins with a discussion of the relevant
federal antitrust statutes. It then discusses the clearance
process between the FTC and the DOJ, the decision to
challenge a proposed transaction in court or in an
administrative trial (for the FTC), and the potential remedies
available to the enforcement agencies, such as divestitures, for
a merger with anticompetitive concerns.
A.

Overview of the Applicable Antitrust Statutes

At the federal level, the framework for the merger
review process is contained in a few relevant statutes, namely
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, and Section 5 of the FTC Act.17 Modern antitrust law really
began with the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890.18 Section
1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations, or
conspiracies in restraint of trade.19 Section 2 prohibits
monopolies and attempts at monopolies.20 The Sherman Act
only prohibits restraints of trade that are unreasonable.21 To
build upon the protection afforded in the Sherman Act,
15

ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 129; Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Bureau of Competition, Guide to the Antitrust Laws, the Enforcers,
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/enforcers.shtm.
16
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of Competition, Guide to the Antitrust Laws,
Mergers: Premerger Notification and the Merger Review Process, http://www.ftc.gov/
bc/antitrust/premerger_notification.shtm.
17
Of course, every state and the District of Columbia have its own statutes
regulating the competitive effects of mergers and acquisitions. See Stephen Calkins,
Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 53 DUKE L.J. 673, 678 (2003).
However, this note will only focus on the federal statutes.
18
See Scott A. Sher, Closed But Not Forgotten: Government Review of
Consummated Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 41,
45 (2004) (tracking the development of modern antitrust law and analyzing numerous
cases involving closed merger challenges by the FTC and DOJ).
19
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
20
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
21
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of Competition, Guide to the Antitrust Laws,
the Antitrust Laws, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/antitrust_laws.shtm.

940

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:3

Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914,22 amended it in 1950
with the Celler-Kefauver amendments to close some loopholes,23
and amended it again in 1976 with the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976 (“HSR Act”).24
1. The Clayton Act
Today, the principal federal antitrust statute is the
Clayton Act, specifically Section 7, which prohibits mergers or
acquisitions “in any line of commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce in any section of the country, [when] the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”25 Even though the
Clayton Act was much more expansive than the Sherman Act,
the lack of a requirement for pre-closing notifications meant
that the government could challenge an anticompetitive
transaction only after it closed.26 By then, it was often too late
to enforce the Clayton Act.27 Aware of the substantial costs and
time involved in such post-consummation challenges, Congress
enacted the HSR Act with the goal of “giving the government
antitrust agencies a fair and reasonable opportunity to detect
and investigate large mergers of questionable legality before
they are consummated.”28 The HSR Act and the establishment
of the premerger notification program would give the antitrust
enforcement agencies such an opportunity.
2. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
The HSR Act is often credited with establishing the
modern merger review process by giving the DOJ and the FTC

22

Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
Celler-Kefauver Amendments, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (Codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006)). After the Celler-Kefauver amendments, Section 7
of the Clayton Act covers both asset acquisitions and stock acquisitions. See Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316 (1962). In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court
reviewed the legislative history and purpose of the amendments. See id. at 315-23.
24
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435,
90 Stat. 1383 (Current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006)).
25
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
26
See Sher, supra note 18, at 52-53.
27
Litigation often took years and even if the government won, there was
often no remedy because the firms were already well integrated. Id. at 52-54.
28
H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 5 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2637,
2637.
23
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the ability to block mergers before consummation.29 Before the
passage of the HSR Act, it was very difficult to challenge a
merger successfully.30 Without advance notice of the
transaction, mergers were typically challenged after they were
already consummated.31 The government also had very little
time to prepare, and carried the burden of proof for obtaining a
preliminary injunction.32 Since these challenges often took
years to litigate, it was very difficult for courts to come up with
an appropriate remedy to restore competition—“that is, to
unscramble the eggs”—because it was very difficult to recreate
the acquired entity as an independent “competitively viable
firm.”33 So even when the government was successful in its
challenge, it was often a hollow victory and too late to gain any
“meaningful relief.”34
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act changed all of this by
requiring the parties to notify the FTC and the DOJ about
mergers and acquisitions of certain sizes before they occur, and
to give the antitrust agencies time to review such transactions
before consummating the proposed transaction.35 Under the
HSR Act, the parties to certain proposed transactions must
notify both the FTC and the DOJ by submitting a “Notification
and Report Form” with some information about the parties and
29

See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 47, 151; Sher,
supra note 18, at 52-54.
30
See H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 8 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2637, 2640; see also Sher, supra note 18, at 52-54 (discussing the difficulties of postconsummation challenges).
31
See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 47; Sher, supra
note 18, at 52-53.
32
See H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 8 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2637, 2640 (“[W]ithout advance notice of an impending merger, data relevant to its
legality, and at least several weeks to prepare a case, the government often has no
meaningful chance to carry its burden of proof, and win a preliminary injunction
against a merger that appears to violate section 7. The weight of this burden cannot be
overemphasized.”).
33
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 47. “Unscrambling
the eggs” is a term used to express the difficulty of a divesture remedy when a merger
is already closed and the assets of the combined firms are integrated. H.R. REP. No. 941373, at 4-5 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2637, 2640-41 (After closing, “the
acquired firm’s assets, technology, marketing systems, and trademarks are replaced,
transferred, sold off, or combined with those of the acquiring firm. Similarly, its
personnel and management are shifted, restrained, or simply discharged. In these
ways, the acquiring and acquired firms are, in effect, irreversibly ‘scrambled’
together.”).
34
H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 8 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2637,
2640. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 151.
35
See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (2006); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of
Competition, Guide to the Antitrust Laws, Mergers: Premerger Notification and the
Merger Review Process, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/premerger_notification.shtm.
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the proposed transaction.36 The HSR Act does not require a
premerger filing for all mergers or acquisitions.37 The filing
thresholds are updated annually, but generally, the parties
must be of a certain size and the deal must be of a certain
value.38 Under the HSR Act, advance notice must be provided to
both the DOJ and the FTC even though only one agency will
review the proposed merger.39 The HSR Act also enables the
agencies to obtain documents and other necessary information
from the parties and third parties to assess whether to
challenge the proposed transaction.40 Congress’s solution to the
time constraint problem was to establish a thirty-day waiting
period.41 During this time, the parties are prohibited from
closing their deal unless the waiting period is granted early
termination by the FTC or the DOJ.42 As a result of the HSR
Act, challenges to consummated deal are relatively rare
because the agencies are able to challenge mergers before they
are consummated.43 Nevertheless, over the last decade, the FTC
has been much more aggressive in challenging closed deals
where the anticompetitive concerns were not apparent during
the merger review process.44
36

Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of Competition, Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger
Notification Program Introductory Guide I, What is the Premerger Notification
Program? An Overview, at 6, (2008) available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/introguides/
guide1.pdf [hereinafter Guide I]. Copies of the form and instructions are available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/hsrforms.htm.
37
In addition to the size of the parties or of the deal, there are a limited
number of exceptions to the HSR Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c) (2006) (exempting certain
transactions from HSR Act’s requirements).
38
See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of Competition, Hart-Scott-Rodino
Premerger Introductory Guide II, To File or Not to File—When you must file a
premerger notification report form, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/introguides/
guide2.pdf. Guide II describes the criteria used to determine whether a transaction is
subject to the requirements of the HSR Act.
39
Guide I, supra note 36, at 11.
40
Id. at 12.
41
See id. at 9. In the case of an all cash tender offer or an acquisition in
bankruptcy, there is a fifteen-day waiting period. Id.
42
Id. at 9.
43
Sher, supra note 18, at 41.
44
See id. at 42 (describing how since 2001, the FTC has challenged
consummated mergers involving MSC Software, Chicago Bridge, Airgas, and Aspen
Technology, as well as seriously investigated dozens more); see also ABA Comments re
Differential Standards, supra note 14, at app. a 2-7 (list of mergers and acquisitions
the FTC has challenged post-closing); D. Bruce Hoffman & M. Sean Royall,
Administrative Litigation at the FTC: Past, Present, and Future, 71 ANTITRUST L.J.
319, 319-20 (2003) (“The FTC today is aggressively continuing to use the
administrative litigation process in the manner envisioned by the agency’s creators . . .
the FTC’s administrative litigation process has become the forum in which many of our
day’s most complex and interesting antitrust issues are being litigated.”).
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3. The Federal Trade Commission Act
The FTC is an administrative agency created by
Congress in 1914 under the Federal Trade Commission Act
(“FTC Act”).45 Only the FTC can bring cases under the FTC
Act.46 The FTC was formed to police “unfair methods of
competition”47 and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.”48 Congress created the FTC to supplement
the DOJ’s enforcement of the antitrust laws, and to help
develop and clarify antitrust policy by giving the FTC
adjudicative power under Section 5(b) of the FTC Act.49 As a
result, the FTC can challenge a transaction in federal courts as
well as through an internal administrative proceeding (known
as a Part III proceeding) before an administrative law judge.50
Whether it wins or loses at the federal court level, the FTC can
still challenge a transaction through administrative litigation.
This allows the FTC to initiate an administrative proceeding to
challenge a transaction pre-consummation or post-consummation.51
B.

Overview of the Merger Review Process

Although the DOJ’s Antitrust Division and the FTC
have shared responsibility for enforcement of the federal
antitrust laws, in practice, only one agency is responsible for
45

See 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006). Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of Competition,
Guide to the Antitrust Laws, The Antitrust Laws, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/
antitrust_laws.shtm.
46
See id. Unlike the DOJ, the FTC does not have criminal enforcement
authority.
47
The term “unfair methods of competition” is generally thought to mean the
same as the prohibitions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION
REPORT, supra note 13, at 129.
48
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006) (“The Commission is hereby empowered and
directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.”).
49
Hoffman & Royall, supra note 44, at 319-20. See American Bar Association,
Section of Antitrust Law, Public Comments Submitted to AMC Regarding Dual
Federal Merger Enforcement, at 2 (Oct. 28, 2005) (“[T]he FTC was designed to function
as an expert body in antitrust law, capable of assessing and adjudicating the
competitive effects of complex transactions”) [hereinafter ABA Comments re Dual
Enforcement]; Fed. Trade Comm’n, Guide to the Federal Trade Commission,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/general/gen03.shtm (“Congress created the
FTC as a source of expertise and information on the economy.”).
50
The FTC may seek a preliminary permanent injunction in federal court
under 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2006). It can commence an administrative proceeding under
15 U.S.C. § 45(b)-(c) (2006).
51
See generally Hoffman & Royall, supra note 44.
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investigating a particular merger. As the law enforcement
agency of the executive branch, the DOJ is entrusted with the
power to bring criminal antitrust cases or civil actions seeking
an injunction and to take steps to remedy past violations.52 As
an administrative agency, the FTC is allowed to seek a
preliminary or permanent injunction in federal court or
commence an internal administrative proceeding.53 Despite
criticism that this dual enforcement arrangement was
unnecessarily duplicative, it has worked relatively well with
few conflicts between the two agencies.54 One of the reasons for
the lack of clashes is that over the years, the two agencies have
developed a “clearance process” where the FTC and the DOJ
will consult with each other, and the matter is “cleared” to one
agency for review.55
1. The Clearance Process
To avoid duplication of enforcement efforts, the DOJ
and the FTC will consult with each other to decide which
agency will conduct a formal investigation of a particular
transaction. During the waiting period, the FTC and the DOJ
will assign the filing to a specific division or section within the
agency having expertise over the industry of the proposed
transaction.56 Initially, both agencies will perform a preliminary
review of the proposed transaction.57 If the assigned division or
section within one agency determines that a formal
investigation is necessary, that agency will seek clearance from
the other agency to conduct an investigation.58 Since only one
agency will be conducting the investigation of the proposed
52

Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Mission of the Antitrust Division,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/about/mission.htm.
53
See supra note 50.
54
See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 129. According
to the Antitrust Modernization Report, “[c]ritics contend that having two agencies
enforce the federal antitrust laws entails unnecessary duplication and can result in
inconsistent antitrust policies, additional burdens on businesses, or other obstacles to
efficient and fair federal antitrust enforcement.” Id.
55
Id. at 132-33; Guide I, supra note 36, at 11.
56
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, THE MERGER
REVIEW PROCESS: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO FEDERAL MERGER REVIEW 26 (3d. ed.
2006) [hereinafter MERGER REVIEW GUIDE].
57
Guide I, supra note 36, at 11.
58
MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 26-27, 134-36. At the DOJ, the
Office of Operations will ask the Premerger Office at the FTC for clearance to
investigate. At the FTC, the Premerger Office will notify the Office of Operations at the
DOJ to coordinate which agency will conduct the investigation. Id. at 27.
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transaction, neither agency will contact the parties or third
parties until it has been decided which agency will be
responsible for investigating the proposed transaction.59 This
minimizes the potential for confusion and duplication of efforts
if both agencies contacted the parties at different times for the
same matter.60
This clearance process determines which agency will
conduct the investigation; this is usually the agency with the
most relevant staff expertise and experience in the industry
potentially affected by the proposed merger.61 For example, the
FTC is responsible for industries where consumer spending is
high, such as health care, pharmaceuticals, food, energy,
computer technology, and internet services.62 If there are
disputes over which agency has more expertise in a given area,
the matter is passed to increasingly senior staff until it is
resolved, potentially all the way up to the Chairman of the FTC
and the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust at the DOJ.63
As a result of the clearance process, only one agency takes
control of the investigation.

59

Guide I, supra note 36, at 11; MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at
136. However, any interested person, including the parties to the proposed transaction,
is free to present information to either or both agencies at any time. Guide I, supra
note 36, at 11.
60
See Guide I, supra note 36, at 11.
61
See MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 27. In 2002, the DOJ and
the FTC reached an accord to explicitly allocate certain industries to each agency. See
Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div. & Federal Trade Comm’n, Memorandum of Agreement
Between the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the United
States Department of Justice Concerning Clearance Procedures for Investigations
(Mar. 5, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/10170.pdf. However, the
accord was short-lived and ended after objections from Senator Ernest F. Hollings. As a
result, the two agencies have continued to decide based on staff expertise and
experience. See Lauren Kearney Peay, The Cautionary Tale of the Failed 2002
FTC/DOJ Merger Clearance Accord, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1307, 1308-10 (2007) (discussing
the failure of the 2002 accord and potential approaches to improving the interaction
between the FTC, the DOJ, and Congress).
62
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of Competition, An FTC Guide to the Antitrust
Laws: The Enforcers, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/enforcers.shtm. However, if one
agency decides not to initiate an investigation, even in an industry where it has quite an
amount of expertise in, the other agency is free to start an investigation. See MERGER
REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 135.
63
See ABA Comments re Dual Enforcement, supra note 49, at 11 & n.16;
MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 135. Although not common, these disputes
between the agencies may cause significant delays in the merger review process. Id. at
136.
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2. Further Investigation Required: Second Request
Once clearance is granted, the investigating agency will
notify the merging parties that an investigation has been
opened. The investigating agency can now obtain information
from various sources, including the merging parties.64 After the
initial investigation, the agency can decide to do three things: it
can grant early termination of the waiting period, allow the
waiting period to expire, or it can issue a Request for
Additional Information (a “second request”).65 The second
request is commonly used to allow the staff more time to
investigate,66 and will often require the parties to provide more
information about the transaction and its potential
anticompetitive effects.67 After the parties have substantially
complied with the second request for information, there is an
additional thirty-day waiting period, after which the agency
must decide whether to approve the merger, seek a preliminary
injunction in federal court to stop the merger, or seek a
voluntary agreement not to close the deal until further
investigation can be completed.68 During this time, the parties
can meet with review officials to argue that their transaction
should not be challenged.69 The investigating agency can also
grant an early termination of the waiting period, or allow it to
expire if they decline to pursue a challenge.70 Either way, the
parties are free to close their transaction at that point.
3. Agency Action: Approve or Litigate
At the DOJ, the staff’s recommendation is first reviewed
by the appropriate section chiefs and increasingly senior
officials before it goes to the ultimate decision maker, the

64

See Guide I, supra note 36, at 12.
See MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 138.
66
See id. at 27-29. The extended waiting period is normally thirty days from
the date of substantial compliance by both merging parties. It is ten days for “a cash
tender offer or certain bankruptcy filings.” Guide I, supra note 36, at 13.
67
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 151; see also Guide
I, supra note 36, at 12.
68
MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 29; see also 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e)(2)
(2006). Parties are often willing to extend the time period voluntarily because it gives
them more time to prepare and to meet with reviewing officials to persuade them not to
challenge the transaction. MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 247-50.
69
MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 29.
70
15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(2) (2006); see also Guide I, supra note 36, at 10.
65
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Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust.71 At the FTC, the
staff recommendation is forwarded to the appropriate deputy
directors and directors before it goes to the final decision
makers, the five commissioners.72 If the merger is approved, or
if thirty days has passed since the parties substantially
complied with the second request, the parties are free to
consummate their transaction.73 If the investigating agency
determines that a merger may substantially lessen
competition, the agency can try to reach a settlement, or it can
seek a preliminary and permanent injunction in the
appropriate district court to enjoin the consummation of the
merger.74
In practice, the agencies will usually try to negotiate
with the merging parties to reach a settlement, either through
a consent decree where the parties agree to a divestiture of
certain assets to ease concerns about the merger’s
anticompetitive effects, or through a less common “fix-it-first”
restructuring of their transaction.75 Depending on the
circumstances, parties can either abandon the transaction,76 or
agree to settle as a way to avoid costly and time-intensive
litigation that could delay the closing of the transaction and the
ensuing efficiencies of the merger.77
C.

Proceeding to Litigation: Challenging a Proposed
Transaction
1. Seeking Injunctive Relief in Federal Court

If the merging parties and the enforcement agency fail
to negotiate a settlement, the FTC and the DOJ are authorized
71

MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 29. For a more in depth
discussion of the process and the decision makers that are involved, see id. at 232-36,
242-47.
72
Id. at 29-30. Parties are given the opportunity to present their case at each
step of the approval process. This includes meeting with each commissioner separately.
A majority vote of the commissioners is necessary for any action. For a more in depth
discussion of the process and the decision makers that are involved, see id. at 232-42.
73
Guide I, supra note 36, at 13.
74
MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 30-31, 254.
75
See id. at 252-53; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., ANTITRUST DIVISION
POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES 1 (2004) [hereinafter DOJ MERGER REMEDIES
GUIDE], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf; see also
Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review:
Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159, 181 (2008).
76
See MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 256-57.
77
See id. at 255.
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to seek injunctive relief in federal court to enjoin a transaction
that they believe raises competitive concerns.78 The DOJ and
the FTC have different approaches when seeking injunctive
relief. Unlike the FTC, the DOJ does not have another avenue
for permanent relief other than the federal court process. As a
result, the DOJ often asks for both a preliminary injunction
and a permanent injunction from the district courts.79 If the
DOJ’s request is denied, the parties can usually consummate
their merger without further concerns of antitrust litigation.80
In contrast, the FTC only seeks a preliminary injunction; if the
FTC loses, the parties still have to worry about the FTC
potentially pursuing costly and lengthy administrative
litigation.81
Due to the need to close a proposed transaction quickly
(to enjoy the efficiencies that come from a merger and to avoid
the costs of litigation), preliminary injunctions are particularly
important to both the parties and the enforcement agencies.82 If
the district court denies the injunction, the agencies normally
treat the denial as final and will not take any further action.83
As a result, the parties can close the merger relatively quickly.84
However, if a court grants the injunction, the parties will most
likely abandon the transaction because very few firms can
withstand the time, costs, and uncertainty involved in an
appeal or an administrative trial.85

78

The DOJ is authorized to seek an injunction under 15 U.S.C. § 25 (2006).
The FTC is authorized to seek an injunction under 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2006).
79
See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 138.
80
The ABA Section of Antitrust Law has not been able to find any example of
the DOJ seeking a permanent injunction after failing to obtain a preliminary
injunction. ABA Comments re Differential Standards, supra note 14, at 5.
81
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 139.
82
See MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 255 (“In many cases, the
preliminary injunction motion will determine the outcome of the case.”).
83
UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES, supra note 4, at 546 (“An
unsuccessful effort to obtain a preliminary injunction can be the plaintiff’s final battle
to block a merger. . . .”).
84
See MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 255; UNDERSTANDING THE
ANTITRUST ISSUES, supra note 4, at 546-47. This is assuming the Court of Appeals fails
to grant a stay pending appeal by the enforcement agency or the FTC decides not to
pursue an administrative proceeding. See infra Part I.C.2.
85
UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES, supra note 4, at 547. ANTITRUST
MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 139.
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2. The FTC Pursuing Administrative Litigation
If the DOJ fails to obtain an injunction, it will abandon
any further litigation.86 However, the FTC has pursued
administrative proceedings after losing at the preliminary
injunction stage.87 The decision by the FTC to pursue an
administrative proceeding is made on a case-by-case basis with
the standard being whether the “pursuit of administrative
litigation after the denial of a preliminary injunction motion
would serve the public interest.”88 Some of the criteria the FTC
uses in its decision include “the district court’s factual findings
and conclusions of law; any new evidence developed during the
preliminary injunction proceeding; whether the transaction
raises important issues of fact, law, or merger injunction policy
that need resolution in administrative litigation; the costs and
benefits of further proceedings; and any additional relevant
factor.”89 An administrative proceeding takes place before an
FTC administrative law judge, with review by the five
commissioners.90 The decision can then be appealed to a federal
appellate court.91
3. Relief: Structural Remedies and Conduct Remedies
Merger concerns can be resolved through negotiation,
resulting in a settlement, or through litigation in court. The
FTC has stated that its remedial objective is to “prevent the
anticompetitive effects likely to result from a merger that the
[FTC] has determined is unlawful.”92 Similarly, according to the
DOJ, “[a]lthough the remedy should always be sufficient to
redress the antitrust violation, the purpose of a remedy is not
to enhance premerger competition but to restore it.”93 Coming
up with an appropriate remedy can be extremely difficult. In
86

MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 255.
Id.
88
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Closes Its Investigation of Arch
Coal’s Acquisition of Triton Coal Company’s North Rochelle Mine (June 13, 2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/
archcoal.htm.
89
Id.
90
Hoffman & Royall, supra note 44, at 322.
91
Id.
92
Federal Trade Comm’n, Negotiating Merger Remedies, Statement of the
Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission, at 4 (April 2, 2003), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/bestpractices/bestpractices030401.pdf.
93
DOJ MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 75, at 4.
87
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fashioning a remedy, the speed, certainty, cost, efficacy, and
ease of monitoring are all important factors that need to be
taken into consideration.94
Merger remedies usually take two basic forms.95 The
first form, a structural remedy, usually involves a divestiture
or the sale of assets by the merged firms.96 The second form, a
conduct remedy, is usually an injunctive provision that
regulates or changes the business conduct of the merged firm.97
Structural remedies are preferred because they require very
little ongoing monitoring by the enforcement agency.98 In
contrast, conduct remedies are not preferred because of the
monitoring costs involved, and the fact that consumers would
ultimately be harmed if the restrained firm fails to survive in a
competitive market.99 A remedy can be a combination of
structural and injunctive remedies.
Divestiture is the primary post-consummation remedy
for a Section 7 violation (or Section 5 of the FTC Act) because
the logical solution to excessive concentration is divesture of
the assets that caused the antitrust problems.100 Since the goal
of divestiture is to restore competition, the agencies try to
ensure that the divestiture remedy contains enough assets for
the purchaser to function as a long-term viable competitor,
with the hope of replacing the competition prior to the
merger.101
II.

FTC V. WHOLE FOODS MARKET, INC.

The tortuous legal battle between the FTC and Whole
Foods might be over, but the D.C. Circuit’s controversial
decision in Whole Foods continues to give the FTC a significant
advantage over the DOJ in challenging a merger and
extracting a settlement. This Part examines the D.C. Circuit
94

Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 7.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. “Structural remedies are preferred to conduct remedies in merger cases
because they are relatively clean and certain, and generally avoid costly government
entanglement in the market.” Id. This is in contrast to conduct remedies, which are
often “more difficult to craft, more cumbersome and costly to administer, and easier
than a structural remedy to circumvent.” Id. at 8.
99
Id. at 8-9.
100
See UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES, supra note 4, at 603; see also
DOJ MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 75, at 7-8.
101
DOJ MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 75, at 9-11.
95
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Court’s fractured opinion. It begins with a discussion of the
merger between Whole Foods and Wild Oats, and the FTC’s
decision to challenge the merger. It then reviews the district
court and the D.C. Circuit’s opinions, and concludes with a
review of the settlement between the FTC and Whole Foods.
A.

Background: The Merger Between Whole Foods and Wild
Oats

At the time of the merger, Whole Foods and Wild Oats,
respectively, were the largest and second largest nationwide
operators of organic supermarkets in the United States.102
Whole Foods operated approximately 194 stores,103 and Wild
Oats operated approximately 110 stores.104 Whole Foods is a
Texas corporation that opened its first store in 1980.105 Wild
Oats is a Delaware corporation that opened its first store in
1987.106 Both chains have expanded over the years by opening
new stores and acquiring other premium natural and organic
supermarkets.107 Both Whole Foods and Wild Oats tried to
differentiate themselves from other supermarkets by focusing
on natural and organic products, as well as a commitment to
quality and service.108 In February 2007, Whole Foods
announced its intent to purchase Wild Oats for an estimated
$565 million.109 The market reacted positively after the
announcement as investors and analysts generally applauded
the merger as necessary in the face of intense competition from

102

Martin, supra note 1.
Id.
104
Id.
105
Whole Foods Market Home Page, About Whole Foods Market,
http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/company/index.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
106
Whole Foods Market Home Page, Company History, http://www.whole
foodsmarket.com/company/history.php#18 (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
107
FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10-11 (D.D.C. 2007),
rev’d, 533 F.3d 869 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Whole Foods acknowledges on its website that
“[m]uch of the growth of [the] company has been accomplished through mergers and
acquisitions. The story of Whole Foods is incomplete without honoring these notable
companies in their own right.” Whole Foods Market Home Page, Company History,
http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/company/history.php#18 (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
108
Proof Brief for Appellant FTC at 5-6, FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548
F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-5276).
109
Martin, supra note 1. The deal was a tender offer for all of Wild Oats stock
at a price of $18.50 per share—a 23% premium over the average share price in January
of 2007. Proof Brief for Appellant FTC, supra note 108, at 6.
103
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larger rivals like Wal-Mart, Safeway, Kroger, and Trader
Joe’s.110
In February 2007, Whole Foods filed the Premerger
Notification and Report Forms with the FTC and DOJ as
required by the HSR Act.111 The merger caught the FTC’s
attention.112 After going through the clearance process, the FTC
was chosen as the investigating agency due to its traditional
expertise in the supermarkets industry.113 After reviewing the
documents from the second request, the FTC authorized its
staff to seek a preliminary injunction under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act.114 In June 2007, the
FTC filed a complaint in the District of Columbia seeking a
preliminary injunction to enjoin the merger.115 All five
commissioners voted in favor of bringing the case.116
In its complaint, the FTC argued that a merger of the
two biggest chains in the premium natural and organic
supermarkets, or PNOS, market would “substantially lessen
competition and thereby cause significant harm to consumers”
by increasing prices and reducing quality and services.117 In
defining the relevant markets, the FTC found that premium
natural and organic supermarkets are different from
110

Martin, supra note 1. One commentator described the merger as
“consistent with how Whole Foods has created value for shareholders for much of its
history. . . .” Id. The chief executive of Wild Oats, Gregory Mays, said he considered the
merger a “perfect marriage” and a “natural fit” because of the intense competition from
much larger rivals who were eager to move into this lucrative and growing market. Id.
In fact, Mr. Mays stated that since “the two stores were the leaders in the natural and
organic marketplace . . . it [was] a ‘perfect marriage’ because the combined company
could focus on larger rivals.” Id.
111
See supra Part I.A.2.
112
See Proof Brief for Appellant FTC, supra note 108, at 6.
113
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, AN FTC GUIDE TO THE ENFORCERS: THE FEDERAL
GOV’T, STATES AND PRIVATE PARTIES (2008), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/factsheets/
FactSheet_FedEnforcers.pdf.
114
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Seeks to Block Whole Foods
Market’s Acquisition of Wild Oats Markets (June 5, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2007/06/wholefoods.shtm.
115
Id; Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction Pursuant to Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act at 2, 5-6,
FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt. Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 07-cv-01021)
[hereinafter FTC Complaint].
116
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 114.
117
FTC Complaint, supra note 115, at 1. See Andrew Martin, F.T.C. to Sue in
Bid to Halt Food Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 6, 2007, at C1 (Jeffrey Schmidt, the director
of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, said in a statement that “Whole Foods and Wild
Oats are each other’s closest competitors in premium natural and organic
supermarkets, and are engaged in intense head-to-head competition in markets across
the country. If Whole Foods is allowed to devour Wild Oats, it will mean higher prices,
reduced quality and fewer choices for consumers.”).
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conventional retail supermarkets because PNOS offer a unique
upscale shopping experience for their customer that is
characterized by a large selection of organic foods and excellent
customer service.118 The FTC alleged that the customer base for
PNOS is different from that of traditional supermarkets
because PNOS customers seek an experience where the
shopping environment can matter as much as the price.119 The
FTC also alleged that Whole Foods and Wild Oats were each
other’s closest competitors in twenty one geographic markets
and that the merger would create monopolies in eighteen
cities.120
Needless to say, the parties involved as well as analysts
who follow the companies and industry were surprised by the
FTC’s decision.121 Analysts and reporters were quick to point
out that the combined entity would only operate about 300
supermarkets.122 By comparison, Wal-Mart, the largest
supermarket chain in the U.S., owns about 3,000 stores that
sell groceries, and Kroger, the second-largest supermarket
chain in the U.S., owns about 2,500 grocery stores.123 Due to the
need to close the merger quickly, the lawsuit at the district
court level was litigated on a very fast track so as to allow the
losing side sufficient time to appeal the decision before the
consummation of the proposed deal, which was scheduled for
August 31, 2007.124

118

FTC Complaint, supra note 115, at 10.
See id. at 8-9.
120
Id. at 11-12.
121
See Martin, supra note 117. One “somewhat bemused” research analyst
remarked that the FTC’s decision was “‘somewhat at odds’ with the recent blurring of
lines between stores like Whole Foods and Trader Joe’s and more conventional chains
like Publix and Wegmans” and the fact that “74 percent of natural and organic foods
were now sold through mass-market channels like conventional supermarkets.” Id.
Whole Foods’ Chief Executive John Mackey said in a statement that “[t]he FTC has
failed to recognize the robust competition in the supermarket industry, which has
grown more intense as competitors increase their offerings of natural, organic and
fresh products; renovate their stores; and open stores with new banners and formats
resembling Whole Foods Market.” Id.
122
David Kesmodel & John R. Wilke, Why Whole Foods Deal Is in Peril—
Pending FTC Challenge To Wild Oats Deal Argues Firms Are in Narrow Arena, WALL
ST. J., Jun. 6, 2007, at A3. Whole Foods and Wild Oats together only accounted for 15%
of the $46 billion natural-foods market. Id.
123
Id.
124
FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2007), rev’d,
533 F.3d 869 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The merger was consummated on August 28, 2007.
119
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The District Court’s Opinion in FTC v. Whole Foods
Market, Inc.

In a thorough opinion, Judge Friedman denied the
FTC’s request for a preliminary injunction because he
concluded the FTC had not demonstrated a likelihood of
success on the merits—that is, that the effects of the merger
“may substantially lessen competition [or] tend to create a
monopoly” in a properly defined relevant product market.125 As
with most antitrust cases, the product market definition was
key.126 After going over the arguments on both sides, Judge
Friedman found that the “economic evidence, market research
studies, and evidence concerning the realities on the ground . . .
all lead to the conclusion that the relevant product market in
this case is not [PNOS] as argued by the FTC but . . . at least
all supermarkets.”127 Judge Friedman also noted that so-called
conventional supermarkets like Wal-Mart, Kroger, and
Safeway were all carrying natural and organic foods.128 In fact,
market research indicated that a majority of natural and
organic goods are now being sold in conventional supermarkets
as they move aggressively into the sale of organic foods.129 With
such stiff competition from more conventional supermarkets,
Judge Friedman believed that post-merger, customers would
still have plenty of competing options to choose from.130 As a
result, Judge Friedman concluded that there was no
substantial likelihood that the FTC would be able to prove its
asserted product market, or that the Whole Foods-Wild Oats
merger would “substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly.”131
Following the district court’s decision, the FTC filed an
emergency motion for an injunction pending the outcome of the
appeal, which was unanimously denied by a three-judge panel
of the D.C. Circuit Court.132 At that point, four federal judges
had looked at the case and all concluded that the FTC had
failed to meet the preliminary injunction standard. Shortly
125

Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 53(b) (2006)).
FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1073 (D.D.C. 1997).
127
Whole Foods, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 34.
128
Id. at 26-27.
129
Id. at 27.
130
Id. at 36.
131
Id. at 49-50.
132
FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2008),
amended and reissued, 592 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2009).
126
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thereafter, the parties closed the merger.133 After closing, Whole
Foods started integrating Wild Oats by converting certain
stores and selling other stores under the Wild Oats family.134
C.

The D.C. Circuit’s Opinions in FTC v. Whole Foods
Market, Inc.

In July 2008, almost a full year after the merger was
consummated, a panel of the D.C. Circuit reversed and
remanded the district court’s decision to deny the FTC’s motion
for a preliminary injunction in a splintered decision with no
majority opinion.135 The decision was amended and reissued in
November 2008.136 Judge Brown, Judge Tatel, and Judge
Kavanaugh each wrote a separate opinion in the July and
November rulings.137 In the July ruling, Judge Brown wrote the
opinion for the court. Judge Tatel wrote a concurring opinion,
and Judge Kavanaugh wrote a dissenting opinion.138 According
to Judge Brown, the district court committed legal error by
rejecting the FTC’s market definition so that it failed to give
adequate weight to the FTC’s evidence.139 The majority thus
held that the FTC had raised enough questions about the
merits of its case against the merger.140 Following the decision,
Whole Foods petitioned the D.C. Circuit for a rehearing en
banc. The petition for rehearing en banc was denied on
November 21, 2008.141 However, on that same day, the threejudge panel amended and reissued its original opinions.142 The
most significant difference between the July and November
rulings was that Judge Tatel no longer concurred in Judge
Brown’s opinion but only in the judgment of the court.143 Judge
Brown and Judge Tatel continued to agree, however, that the

133

Proof Brief for Appellant FTC, supra note 108, at 4 n.3.
Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1033 (“Whole Foods has already closed some Wild
Oats stores and sold others. In addition, Whole Foods has sold two complete lines of
stores, Sun Harvest and Harvey’s, as well as some unspecified distribution facilities.”).
135
FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 533 F.3d 869, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
136
Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1028.
137
Id.
138
See id.
139
Id. at 873.
140
Id. at 882.
141
Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1028.
142
Id.
143
Id.
134
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district court’s decision should be reversed and remanded for
further proceedings.144
Judge Brown believed that the district court used the
correct standard for granting a preliminary injunction, but
incorrectly applied the standard in its analysis of the product
market.145 According to Judge Brown, in deciding whether to
grant an injunction, “a district court must balance the
likelihood of the FTC’s success against the equities, under a
sliding scale.”146 However, this balancing test will often weigh in
favor of the FTC because “the public interest in effective
enforcement of the antitrust laws’ was Congress’s specific
‘public equity consideration’ in enacting the provision.”147 Thus,
the FTC will usually be able to obtain a preliminary injunction
by “rais[ing] questions going to the merits so serious,
substantial, difficult[,] and doubtful as to make them fair
ground for thorough investigation.”148
According to Judge Brown, the district court did not
appropriately apply the standard because it incorrectly found
that the FTC failed to present evidence of a likelihood of
success and therefore never weighed the equities.149 The district
court erred when it assumed that “marginal customers,”150 and
not “core customers,”151 must be the focus of an antitrust
analysis.152 Instead, Judge Brown stated that core consumers
should be given consideration as a separate submarket in
certain cases, such as when there is a distinct service or a
specialized or “unique environment.”153 Judge Brown believed
that the FTC’s evidence demonstrated that there was a distinct
PNOS submarket of core customers who shop exclusively at
Whole Foods or Wild Oats for their unique environment.154 As a
result, the district court had underestimated the FTC’s
144

Id.
Id. at 1034-36.
146
Id. at 1035.
147
Id. (quoting FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
148
Id. (quoting Heinz, 246 F.3d at 714-15).
149
Id. at 1035-36.
150
A marginal consumer is someone who would switch to a competitor if his
primary choice imposed a small but significant and nontransitory price increase
(typically 5%). See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2007),
rev’d, 533 F.3d 869 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
151
Core customers are the customers who refuse to switch despite a price
increase. Id. at 16-17.
152
Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1037.
153
Id. at 1037-39.
154
Id. at 1039-40.
145
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likelihood of success on the merits.155 Since the district court did
not reach the equities in its decision, Judge Brown and Judge
Tatel both agreed to remand the case back to the district court
to determine whether policy considerations weighed against
the injunction.156
After the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the FTC made it clear
that it wanted to commence an in-house administrative trial on
the merger, scheduled to begin in April of 2009.157 Thus, the
FTC had two cases on parallel tracks: one in the district court
(Whole Foods), and the other in an internal administrative
proceeding. On January 29, 2009, the FTC announced that it
would temporarily halt its review of the merger so that the
FTC and Whole Foods could engage in settlement talks.158 On
March 6, 2009, almost 21 months after the FTC first sued
Whole Foods in federal court to stop the deal, Whole Foods and
the FTC announced a settlement.159
D.

The Settlement Between the FTC and Whole Foods

The consent agreement between Whole Foods and the
FTC required Whole Foods to divest thirty-two Wild Oats
stores and assets related to those stores in seventeen separate
geographic markets.160 However, out of the thirty-two stores,
only thirteen stores were operating at the time of the
agreement.161 Whole Foods had closed the other nineteen stores,
but still retained control over them.162 Whole Foods was also
required to divest Wild Oats intellectual property, including
the rights to the Wild Oats brand.163 The FTC believed that
“[e]ven months after the acquisition, the Wild Oats brand name
155

Id. at 1041.
Id.
157
See Brent Kendall, FTC is Planning Hearings on Whole Foods Merger,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2008, at B8.
158
Commission Order Withdrawing Matter From Adjudication, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, In the Matter of Whole Foods Market, Inc., and Wild Oats Markets, Inc., No.
9324 (2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9324/090128orderwithdrawingmatter.pdf.
159
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 2.
160
Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Orders To Aid Public Comment
at 3, In the Matter of Whole Foods Market, Inc., and Wild Oats Markets, Inc., No. 9324
(2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9324/090306wfanal.pdf [hereinafter Analysis of
Agreement].
161
Id. at 3. These are referred to as live stores. Id. at 3 n.4.
162
Id. at 3. These are referred to as dark stores. Id. at 3 n.4.
163
Decision and Order at 2, In the Matter of Whole Foods Market, Inc., and
Wild Oats Markets, Inc., No. 9324 (2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9324/
090306wfdo.pdf [hereinafter Decision and Order].
156
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retains significant brand equity that has been developed over
the past 20 years.”164 While the stores may be divested to more
than one FTC-approved buyer, the Wild Oats intellectual
property may be divested to only a single FTC-approved
buyer.165 The consent agreement appointed a divestiture trustee
to oversee the marketing and sale of the assets.166 The consent
agreement also includes an order to maintain assets, which
requires Whole Foods to continue to operate the stores in a way
that preserves marketability and competitiveness until a FTCapproved buyer is found.167 In the end, the divestitures will only
“offer relief in 17 of the 29 geographic markets alleged in the
amended administrative complaint.”168
III.

THE CHOICE OF THE ENFORCEMENT AGENCY IS
OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE AFTER WHOLE FOODS

Due to the statutory authority granted to the FTC in the
FTC Act, there are important procedural differences between
the FTC and the DOJ. First, as seen in Whole Foods, the FTC
enjoys a lower standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction
than the DOJ.169 Second, the FTC’s statutory authority to
commence administrative litigation, even after a denial of a
request for a preliminary injunction, creates uncertainty about
the proposed transaction—a risk not faced if the DOJ is
challenging the merger.170 The divergence between the two
agencies is most troubling when the FTC decides to pursue an
administrative trial post-consummation, as seen in its battle
with Whole Foods. With the status of their merger in legal
limbo (and already well integrated), the parties are forced to
defend their merger in a long and costly administrative
proceeding, a risk they do not face if the DOJ is challenging it.
This Part argues that the substantive outcome of a merger
challenge depends on which agency is challenging it; that is,
the choice of enforcement agency is outcome-determinative.171
The preliminary injunction standard for the FTC as articulated
in Whole Foods puts the debate on whether the choice of
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171

Analysis of Agreement, supra note 160, at 3.
Decision and Order, supra note 163, at 4.
Id. at 3. The FTC appointed The Food Partners as the divestiture trustee.
Analysis of Agreement, supra note 160, at 4.
Id. at 3.
See infra Part III.A.
See supra Part I.C.2.
See ABA Comments re Differential Standards, supra note 14, at 9.
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enforcement agency is outcome-determinative to rest with an
empathetic “yes” in the D.C. Circuit.
A.

The Divergence in Preliminary Injunction Standards for
the DOJ and the FTC

The most significant aspect of the Whole Foods decision
is not the substance of the decision, but rather the preliminary
injunction standard for the FTC. There has been an ongoing
debate about whether the FTC faces a preliminary injunction
burden that is lower than that of the DOJ.172 In its report, the
Antitrust Modernization Commission stated that “[t]here is at
least a perception, if not a reality, that the FTC and the DOJ
face different standards” and the standard for the FTC is “less
burdensome, or is generally perceived to be less burdensome,
than the standard applicable to DOJ actions” for obtaining a
preliminary injunction.173 After Judge Brown’s opinion in Whole
Foods, the perception that the FTC faces a lower preliminary
injunction standard is no longer just perception, it is a fact.
Traditionally, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must
prove: (1) irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted, (2)
the injury outweighs any harm to the defendant by the
172

See Report of the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association
to the Antitrust Modernization Commission at 10 (2004), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
amc/comments/abaantitrustsec.pdf (“DOJ has to meet the regular district court
standards when seeking preliminary injunctive relief . . . subjecting itself to a full
hearing on the merits and a higher standard of proof. In contrast, the FTC typically
seeks only preliminary injunctive relief from the district court and does so under a
standard that, as written, appears to be less demanding than that facing other litigants
(including the DOJ), reserving trial on the merits for agency adjudication. Most
transactions are abandoned if an injunction under any standard is granted. Thus, some
lawyers believe that the apparently lower burden for the FTC could lead to different
outcomes.”). But see Hearing on Federal Civil Remedies for Antitrust Offenses:
Statement of Commissioner Thomas B. Leary Before the Antitrust Modernization
Commission at 5 (2005), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/051201civilremedies.pdf
(“The ABA submission points out, first, that some decisions seem to apply a more
lenient standard when the FTC applies for a preliminary injunction than they do when
the DOJ applies. It is not possible to know whether the facially different standards
have been outcome-determinative; I personally doubt that they have been in recent
years, and suspect our litigators would agree.”); Observations on Federal Antitrust
Enforcement Institutions: Comments of W. Blumenthal to the Antitrust Modernization
Commission at 6 (2005), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/11/051103gcstmntonfedantitrust
enforcement.pdf (“Because the preliminary injunction standards applied to actions
brought by the FTC and DOJ appear to be substantially identical, any differences in
their application would seem more likely to be based upon the specific facts of a given
matter than substantive legal standards. So far as I am aware there is no evidence that
any cases or group of cases were or would have been decided differently based on which
of the antitrust agencies was the plaintiff.”).
173
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 141-42.
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injunction, (3) the plaintiff has a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits, and (4) the injunction is in the public
interest.174 Due to its status as an administrative agency, the
FTC is subjected to a different preliminary injunction standard
than the DOJ. The DOJ is subjected to the traditional test
articulated above,175 while the FTC is subjected to the standard
set forth in Section 13(b) of the FTC Act.176 Under Section 13(b)
of the FTC Act, the FTC can obtain an injunction “[u]pon a
proper showing that, weighing the equities and considering the
Commission’s likelihood of ultimate success, such action would
be in the public interest.”177 Courts have read Congress’s intent
in Section 13(b) as making injunctive relief “broadly available
to the FTC”178 and the appropriate test to be a “public interest”
test—that is, “the court evaluates whether it is in the public
interest to enjoin the proposed merger.”179
At the preliminary injunction stage, the FTC is not
required to prove that the proposed merger would in fact
violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act.180 Instead, the FTC is only
required to show that it is likely to succeed in showing under
Section 7 that the proposed merger “may be substantially to
lessen competition” or “tend to create a monopoly.”181 In Whole
Foods, Judge Brown made it clear that the FTC will usually be
able to obtain a preliminary injunction blocking a merger by
“rais[ing] questions going to the merits so serious, substantial,
174

DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL IV-15
(4th ed. 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/
atrdivman.pdf [hereinafter ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL]; UNDERSTANDING THE
ANTITRUST ISSUES, supra note 4, at 564.
175
ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 174 (“The Federal Rules do not
prescribe a standard for granting or denying a PI. Traditional equitable considerations
apply.”).
176
See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2006); see also United States v. Gillette Co., 828 F.
Supp. 78, 80 (D.D.C. 1993) (comparing the preliminary injunction standards for the
DOJ and FTC).
177
15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2006); see FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 714 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (“Congress intended this standard to depart from what it regarded as the
then-traditional equity standard.”).
178
FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Congress
further demonstrated its concern that injunctive relief be broadly available to the FTC
by incorporating a unique ‘public interest’ standard in 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), rather than
the more stringent, traditional ‘equity’ standard for injunctive relief.”).
179
H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 713.
180
E.g., id. at 714; FTC v. Libbey, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 34, 44 (D.D.C. 2002)
(“Congress used the words may be substantially to lessen competition . . . to indicate
that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties.” (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962))).
181
H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 714; Libbey, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 44; FTC v. Staples,
Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1071 (D.D.C. 1997).
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difficult[,] and doubtful as to make them fair ground for
thorough investigation.”182 Despite “at best, poorly explained
evidence” on the FTC’s part,183 the FTC’s statutory authority to
engage in adjudicative administrative proceedings means that
it can create a presumption in favor of an injunction just by
raising serious and doubtful questions about the merits of the
case.184 In other words, the FTC is entitled to an injunction
unless the FTC has “entirely failed to show a likelihood of
success.”185 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Kavanaugh argued
that Judge Brown and Judge Tatel’s dilution of the preliminary
injunction standard amounted to allowing “the FTC to just
snap its fingers and temporarily block a merger.”186 After Whole
Foods, the question is no longer how much the FTC must show
in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, but rather how
little the FTC can show in order to obtain such an injunction.
Furthermore, Judge Brown stated that it “is not to say
market definition will always be crucial to the FTC’s likelihood
of success on the merits. Nor does the FTC necessarily need to
settle on a market definition at this preliminary stage.”187
Basically, Judge Brown believes that while the FTC must
define a relevant market to prevail on the merits, it does not
need to do so to at the preliminary injunction stage.188 Judge
Brown believes that the FTC can satisfy its burden of proof by
simply showing that it has a chance of defining a market, even
if it initially defines the market incorrectly. Under this
standard, the FTC will be able to obtain a preliminary
injunction just by speculating that a merger may reduce
competition. Parties seeking to merge would be at a severe
disadvantage when responding to the FTC’s requests because
the FTC can put forth ambiguous market definitions and argue
that it will prove the correct market definition in a later
administrative proceeding. Since the FTC does not have to
define the market correctly at the preliminary injunction stage,
182

FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing
H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 714-15).
183
Id. at 1032.
184
Id. at 1035.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 1052 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
187
Id. at 1036.
188
See id. at 1036-37. (“[T]he FTC may have alternate theories of the merger’s
anticompetitive harm, depending on inconsistent market definitions . . . . One may
have such doubts without knowing exactly what arguments will eventually prevail.
Therefore, a district court’s assessment of the FTC’s chances will not depend, in every
case, on a threshold matter of market definition.”).
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this deference to the FTC allows the FTC to challenge
previously marginal cases, resulting in a greater number of
merger challenges.189 Going forward, this lowered preliminary
injunction standard makes it far easier for the FTC to block
mergers in the D.C. Circuit.
B.

The Whole Foods Preliminary Injunction Standard
Combined with the FTC’s Ability to Pursue
Administrative Litigation Is Outcome-Determinative

After Whole Foods, it is difficult to see how the FTC
would not win at the district court level, especially when it is
entitled to a presumption of injunctive relief unless it has
“entirely failed to show a likelihood of success.”190 Even if the
district court somehow denies the preliminary injunction, the
FTC can still use the threat of an administrative proceeding to
force the parties to settle or to terminate the transaction. The
FTC’s ability to prolong a merger challenge with an
administrative trial puts enormous pressure on merging
parties to either settle or terminate the transaction, even
though the transaction had closed. As seen in Whole Foods, the
choice of the FTC as the investigating agency played a big role
in the outcome of the case and subsequent settlement. These
divergences between the DOJ and the FTC subject merging
parties to different legal obligations, and impose costs and
inefficiencies on parties that may be passed on to consumers.
1. The FTC Has More Leverage in the Settlement
Context
The FTC’s ability to pursue administrative litigation
gives it a significant advantage that the DOJ lacks in
negotiating a settlement, as few parties will want to litigate a
full administrative trial and face the risk of expensive and
disruptive divestitures.191 Unlike the FTC, the DOJ enjoys no
presumption in favor of preliminary injunctive relief.192 To avoid
duplication of efforts, the DOJ usually agrees with the merging
parties to consolidate the hearings for preliminary and
189

See infra Part III.B.2.
Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1035.
191
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 142.
192
See Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1035. Unlike the FTC, the DOJ is still
subject to the traditional equity test for a preliminary injunction. See supra Part
III.A.1.
190
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permanent injunctions.193 If the DOJ fails to obtain a
preliminary injunction, and barring an appeal, the parties are
free to consummate their transaction.194 In contrast, the FTC’s
ability to commence administrative litigation imposes a
different timeframe and uncertainties on the merging parties,
giving the FTC greater leverage in negotiating a consent
agreement with the parties than the DOJ.195 In its Antitrust
Modernization Report, the Antirust Modernization Commission
recognized that the “mere availability” of a potential
administrative trial “can harm parties by creating uncertainty
as to the legal status of their transaction, a risk not faced when
the DOJ brings a challenge to a merger.”196 The threat of
administrative litigation imposes delays, uncertainties, and
costs on parties whose merger is reviewed by the FTC, a risk
they do not face if the merger was reviewed by the DOJ.197
Rather than risking lengthy and expensive litigation, parties to
a proposed transaction will be more likely to either settle or
terminate the transaction if the FTC is adamant about
challenging the transaction.198
The divergences between the two agencies are
particularly acute when the FTC decides to pursue an
administrative trial post-consummation. The leverage the FTC
has over merging parties is even more apparent in the
consummated merger context, where the parties have little
choice but to either litigate the administrative trial or settle.
By then, the assets are all “scrambled” and the combined entity
is already well integrated. Since the parties are already well
integrated, the parties will be forced to either settle from a
disadvantaged bargaining position or defend their merger in a
long and costly administrative proceeding, a risk they do not
face if the DOJ was challenging the merger. Thus, there is
193

ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 139.
Id. According to the American Bar Association’s Section of Antitrust Law,
“[a]lthough the DOJ has the option of seeking permanent relief in federal court after
failing to obtain a [preliminary injunction], we have not been able to find any examples
of the DOJ having done so.” ABA Comments re Differential Standards, supra note 14,
at 5.
195
See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 140-42.
196
Id. at 139.
197
See id.
198
See Frankel, supra note 75, at 182 (“Relatedly, and perhaps more
importantly, it is evident (particularly to members of the defense bar) that an antitrust
agency seeking a merger remedy typically has considerable negotiating leverage given
that it may be difficult and costly for the defendants to fight the agency in court;
indeed; the merger may not survive long enough to permit a court fight.”).
194
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much greater pressure to settle a matter when the transaction
is being challenged by the FTC.
2. The FTC Has More Freedom to Challenge Marginal
Cases
Commentators were surprised by the FTC’s persistence
in its battle with Whole Foods.199 The settlement between the
FTC and Whole Foods confirmed their suspicions that the case
against Whole Foods was marginal at best. Despite what
appears to be a significant divestiture of the Wild Oats assets,
the settlement demonstrates the difficulties the FTC faces in
fashioning effective post-closing relief. Not only is the burden
on the parties and the divergence between the agencies
particularly acute when the FTC pursues administrative
litigation post-consumption, but the post-closing relief that it
attains is not even necessarily in the public’s interest. As seen
in the Whole Foods consent agreement, post-closing relief often
does not fully resolve the anticompetitive harm or restore
competition, thus wasting time and resources, as well as
potentially harming consumers when parties pass on the costs
to them.
First, the settlement does not resolve the
anticompetitive harms. After the merger closed, Whole Foods
began integrating Wild Oats by rebranding Wild Oats stores,
closing certain Wild Oats locations, and terminating certain
leases.200 With this amount of “scrambling,” it becomes very
difficult to “unscramble the eggs” and restore the acquired firm
to its former status as a competitively viable company.201 As a
result, the terms of the consent agreement are certainly much
less vigorous than what the FTC would have sought before the
199

The influential Wall Street Journal denounced the FTC’s persistence in
challenging the merger as antitrust double jeopardy and a “rigged game” in an
editorial. Editorial, Whole Foods Fiasco, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2008, at A8. According to
the Journal,
[t]he Whole Foods fiasco is an embarrassment for the Bush Administration’s
antitrust policy. This month, eight Senators on the Judiciary Committee
sounded a note of caution about the FTC’s actions, and no less than
Democratic antitrust scourge John Conyers has said he would like to hold
hearings on abolishing the FTC’s administrative proceedings. When antitrust
enforcement becomes a law unto itself, it’s time for some organic changes for
regulators.
Id.
200
201

FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Sher, supra note 18, at 52-53.
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consumption of the merger.202 For example, the thirty two stores
that Whole Foods is to divest will only provide relief in
seventeen of the twenty nine geographic markets where the
FTC alleged the merger would cause competitive harm.203 Over
this two-year period, Whole Foods spent at least $16.5 million
defending the merger.204 The FTC declined to say how much it
spent but it was no doubt quite a substantial amount of
taxpayer’s money.205 Despite all this time and resources, the
only relief for the twelve other affected geographic markets is
the mere divestiture of the Wild Oats name.
Second, it is doubtful that the settlement will restore
competition. Although the FTC hopes that reestablishing a
PNOS competition under the Wild Oats name will restore the
competition that was eliminated by the acquisition, and
provide a “springboard for broader competition nationwide,” it
is unclear when this future competition will occur, if it occurs
at all.206 The two separate organic grocers before the merger,
and the combined entity since the merger has forced its
competitors—much larger supermarket chains with thousands
of more stores—to adopt a similar strategy of offering organic
natural foods and better customer services.207 When the merger
was first announced, many analysts hailed the move as a
202

Analysis of Agreement, supra note 160, at 5 (“The absence of preconsummation relief from the district court, and Whole Foods’ subsequent integration
activities, have made it more difficult for the Commission to obtain complete relief in
this matter.”).
203
Id. at 3.
204
Andrew Martin, Wait. Why Is the F.T.C. After Whole Foods?, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2008, at BU8.
205
Id.
206
Analysis of Agreement, supra note 160, at 5.
207
See David Kesmodel, Supervalu to Launch Organic-Foods Line, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 9, 2008, at B2. For example, Supervalu Inc., the third largest U.S. food retailer
by sales, recently announced a line of organic and natural foods to compete with its
rivals like Whole Foods and Trader Joe’s, and also to meet consumer demand. Id. “The
company trails other conventional grocers in launching an organics line, but its
selection will be among the largest. Safeway Inc. has had success with its O Organics
brand, begun in late 2005, while Kroger last August introduced an expanded array of
organic products under its Private Selection label.” Id. The successes of the other
supermarkets are reflected in the decline of Whole Foods’. As Andrew Martin writes:
It was not too long ago that Whole Foods, based in Austin, Tex., was a darling
of Wall Street and routinely registered double-digit growth in comparable
store sales, a common industry measure of the health of stores. But the
company has been battered by competition from traditional grocery stores
that have expanded their offerings of organic and natural foods.
Andrew Martin, Private Equity Firm Buys 17% of Whole Foods, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
2008 at B12.
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sensible deal and necessary if both firms wanted to continue
growing as they tried to fend off much larger supermarkets.208
However, due to intense competition from other supermarkets,
the general economic condition over the last few years, and the
ensuing decrease in consumer spending, little has gone right
for Whole Foods since 2007.209 Fortunately, amid a stabilizing
economy, recent earnings data suggest the company is on the
road to recovery.210
As supermarket chains continue to enter this lucrative
market, consumers have benefitted from the increased number
of competitors.211 It is difficult to see how consumers will benefit
from a reconstituted Wild Oats or a weakened Whole Foods,
and even more difficult to see who would buy the Wild Oats
name. A reconstituted Wild Oats will be a greatly weakened
firm, facing off against a greater number of competitors than
before the merger. Whatever the benefits of the divestiture, it
is outweighed by the time and resources the FTC has put into
this matter. It is difficult to believe that a divestiture of
thirteen operating stores and the Wild Oats name is a victory
for the FTC after a two year legal battle.
Before the Whole Foods decision, it was debatable if the
different legal preliminary injunction standards would produce
different results.212 But as Whole Foods made clear, whether a
proposed transaction may proceed does depend on which
208

One analyst compared the merger “to two knights who decide to stop
fighting each other so they can protect the castle against bigger competitors.” Martin,
supra note 1.
209
See David Kesmodel, Corporate News: Whole Foods Gets Infusion, Posts
Steep Drop in Net, WALL ST. J, Nov. 6, 2008, at B2 (“[Whole Foods] has been hit hard
by the weak economy as consumers cut back on discretionary spending and buy more
store brands and discounted groceries.”); Timothy W. Martin, Corporate News: Whole
Foods to Sell 31 Stores in FTC Deal, WALL ST. J, March 7, 2009, at B5 (“A lot has
changed since 2007, when the FTC said the merger would ‘mean higher prices, reduced
quality and fewer choices for consumers.’ In the past year, Whole Foods has seen its
profits battered by the economic recession and stiffer competition from traditional food
retailers like Safeway Inc. and Supervalu Inc.”).
210
See Paul Sonne & Timothy W. Martin, Whole Foods Profit Jumps as
Turnaround Takes Root, WALL ST. J, Feb. 17, 2010, at B5. “The Austin, Texas-based
grocery chain reported profit of $49.7 million, or 32 cents a share, compared with $27.8
million, or 20 cents a share [in 2009]. Same-store sales, a key measure of retail health,
rose 2.5%. Total sales for the quarter ended Jan. 17 climbed 7% to $2.6 billion from
$2.47 billion.” Id. Whole Foods attributed the gains to a retooled strategy of lower
prices and smaller stores to gain customers back. Id.
211
See Editorial, supra note 199 (“The market for natural and organic produce
has exploded, with every discount outlet from Wal-Mart to Wegmans now offering
organic products.”).
212
See supra note 172; see also ABA Comments re Differential Standards,
supra note 14, at 4.
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agency is reviewing the transaction. Unlike the FTC, the DOJ
enjoys no presumption in favor of preliminary injunctive
relief.213 If the DOJ fails to obtain a preliminary injunction, and
any appeals (very unlikely) are exhausted, the parties are free
to consummate their transaction. If the DOJ was the
investigating agency in Whole Foods, Whole Foods would have
been free to consummate the merger after its victory at the
district court level. Unlike the FTC, the DOJ lacks the power to
prolong challenged mergers until the parties settle. The effect
of this divergence between the agencies is inconsistency and
unpredictability in the marketplace. After Whole Foods, it is
clear that the best possible outcome for parties seeking to
merge would be for the proposed transaction to be cleared for
review by the DOJ. The perception that the choice of
investigating agency is outcome-determinative is no longer just
perception. It is a fact.
IV.

SOLUTION: MINIMIZING THE DIVERGENCES

In a dual enforcement system, it should not matter
which agency is challenging the merger. The merging parties
should “receive comparable treatment and face similar burdens
regardless of whether the FTC or the DOJ reviews their
merger.”214 Divergences between the FTC and the DOJ
undermine consistency, predictability, efficiency, and fairness
in the merger review process.215 More importantly, such
divergences make it clear that the ultimate decision as to
whether a transaction may proceed depends on which agency is
reviewing the transaction.216
This Note discusses two approaches to harmonizing the
divergences between the FTC and the DOJ. The first approach
is a judicial solution: to limit the expansive language in Whole
Foods. The second approach is a legislative approach,
specifically for Congress to amend the FTC Act to specify that
the FTC is subject to the same standard for the grant of a
preliminary injunction as the DOJ.

213
214
215
216

See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 138.
See id. at 138-39.
See id.
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Judicial Solution

The most significant difference between the July and
November rulings in Whole Foods was that Judge Tatel no
longer concurred in Judge Brown’s opinion but only in the
judgment of the court.217 As a result of Judge Tatel’s revision,
Judge Brown’s opinion was no longer the majority opinion of
the court, and there were questions about the precedential
value of the decision.218 However, any hope that the D.C. Circuit
would limit the expansive language found in Whole Foods was
dashed in FTC v. CCC Holdings, Inc.,219 where the preliminary
injunction standard articulated in Whole Foods helped the FTC
obtain their first preliminary injunction from a federal district
court in nearly seven years.220 On March 18, 2009, less than a
week after Whole Foods settled with the FTC, Judge Collyer
issued a preliminary injunction that stopped the proposed
merger between CCC Holdings and Mitchell International.221
The FTC had argued that the merger of CCC Holdings and
Mitchell International would reduce the number of competitors
in the relevant market from three to two.222 In enjoining the
CCC Holdings merger, Judge Collyer adopted Judge Brown’s
diluted preliminary injunction standard articulated in Whole
Foods.223 As a result, Judge Collyer granted the injunction
because the FTC had “raised questions going to the merits so
serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful as to make them fair
ground for thorough investigation, study, deliberation and
determination by the FTC.”224 Rather than risking an
administrative trial, CCC Holdings and Mitchell International
abandoned their transaction on March 11, 2009.225

217

Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1028.
See id. at 1061 n.8 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). According to Judge
Kavanaugh, “this confused decision will invite years of uncertainty and litigation over
what the holding of this case is-a separate but important problem with the Court’s
approach.” Id.
219
605 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2009).
220
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Competition Acting Director David
Wales to Leave FTC, (April 1, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/
04/dwales.shtm.
221
CCC Holdings, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 30.
222
Id.
223
Id. at 35-36.
224
Id. at 30 (citing Heinz, 246 F.3d at 714-15; Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1035
(Brown, J.); id. at 1042 (Tatel, J., concurring)).
225
See Press Release, CCC Information Services Inc., supra note 9.
218
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CCC Holdings, Inc. made it clear that Judge Brown’s
opinion was now binding precedent.226 The FTC read the case in
the same way. In a speech about the FTC’s relationship to the
legislative,
executive,
and
judicial
branches,
FTC
Commissioner Thomas Rosch stated that:
The CCC case confirms that Whole Foods established a new
standard for FTC preliminary injunctions—at least for the D.C.
Circuit. It is also clear, based on the express language in both the
Whole Foods and CCC opinions, that this new standard will allow
the FTC to more readily obtain a preliminary injunction from a
federal district court. We are unlikely to see decisions like Arch Coal
again in the D.C. District Court, where the FTC brings most of its
merger enforcement actions and which is required to apply the law
of the D.C. Circuit. Of course, there are 11 other regional circuit
courts for which Whole Foods is not binding authority, but I expect
that these courts will adopt the D.C. Circuit’s 13(b) standard as the
opportunity arises.227

After CCC Holdings, it appears that the best approach to
harmonizing the divergences between the DOJ and the FTC
would have to be a legislative approach.
B.

Legislative Solution

The Antitrust Modernization Commission was created
to undertake “a comprehensive review of U.S. antitrust law to
determine whether it should be modernized.”228 It delivered its
final report in 2007.229 One area of antitrust law the
Commission reviewed and recommended improvements for was
the enforcement process. The Commission recognized that
there was “a perception, if not a reality, that the FTC and the
DOJ face different standards for obtaining a preliminary
injunction,” and called for Congress to remedy the growing

226

See CCC Holdings, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 36. According to Judge Collyer,
“precedents irrefutably teach that in this context ‘likelihood of success on the merits’
has a less substantial meaning than in other preliminary injunction cases. Heinz not
only emphasized this point but Whole Foods makes clear that Heinz remains good law.”
Id. at 36 n.11.
227
J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Thoughts on the
FTC’s Relationship (Constitutional and Otherwise) to the Legislative, Executive, and
Judicial Branches, Remarks before the Berlin Forum for EU-US Legal-Economics
Affairs, at 20-21 (Sept. 19, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/
090919roschberlinspeech.pdf.
228
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at i.
229
Id.
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divergences between the DOJ and the FTC.230 The Commission
made three recommendations in this regard:
24. The Federal Trade Commission should adopt a policy that when
it seeks injunctive relief in Hart-Scott-Rodino Act merger cases in
federal court, it will seek both preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief, and will seek to consolidate those proceedings so long as it is
able to reach agreement on an appropriate scheduling order with the
merging parties.
25. Congress should amend Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act to prohibit the Federal Trade Commission from
pursuing administrative litigation in Hart-Scott-Rodino Act merger
cases.
26. Congress should ensure that the same standard for the grant of
a preliminary injunction applies to both the Federal Trade
Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
by amending Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act to
specify that, when the Federal Trade Commission seeks a
preliminary injunction in a Hart-Scott-Rodino Act merger case, the
Federal Trade Commission is subject to the same standard for the
grant of a preliminary injunction as the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice.231

The Commission believed these recommendations would
eliminate the divergences between the DOJ and the FTC. If the
FTC seeks both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief in
the same proceeding, this practice would be consistent with the
DOJ’s current approach, and would eliminate the difference in
burden of proof for the two agencies.232 To avoid the appearance
of inconsistency, unpredictability, and unfairness in the merger
review process, the Commission recommended the elimination
of the FTC’s ability to commence administrative litigation in
HSR Act merger cases.233 The Commission believed that the
elimination of administrative litigation would provide the FTC
with further incentive to seek permanent relief in a district
court, and not in an administrative trial.234 Finally, to ensure
230

Id. at 141.
Id. at 139-41.
232
Id. at 139. Since the DOJ seeks both preliminary and permanent
injunctions in the same proceeding, it has to prove the proposed transaction “would
violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act by a preponderance of the evidence.” In contrast,
the FTC only seeks a preliminary injunction so its burden required for obtaining a
preliminary injunction is lower. Id.
233
See id. at 140.
234
Id. at 141. The Commission noted that the elimination of administrative
trials would only apply in HSR Act merger cases, and would not affect the FTC’s ability
to commence administrative trials for consummated mergers. “The proposed statutory
231
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that courts apply the same preliminary injunction standard for
both enforcement agencies, the Commission recommended that
Congress amend the FTC Act to remove any standard for
granting a preliminary injunction in HSR cases.235 The
Commission believed that the elimination of the “public
interest” language would lead courts to apply the traditional
equity test used for the DOJ.236
While the Commission’s recommendations will likely
play a large role in the implementation of any legislative
solution, it appears the recommendation with the best chance
for success would be for Congress to amend Section 13(b) of the
FTC Act to specify that the DOJ and the FTC is subject to the
same preliminary injunction standard. The Commission’s other
two recommendations, eliminating administrative proceedings
in HSR Act merger cases and requiring the FTC to seek both
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief in the same
proceedings, are likely to engender significant opposition from
the FTC and the Obama administration. During his
presidential campaign, President Obama made it clear that he
would direct his administration “to reinvigorate antitrust
enforcement” and “step up review of merger activity and take
effective action to stop or restructure those mergers that are
likely to harm consumer welfare, while quickly clearing those
that do not.”237 It is unlikely that the Obama administration,
which has signaled its support for vigorous antitrust
enforcement, would weaken the FTC’s antitrust enforcement
ability by eliminating its administrative litigation authority.238
Any such efforts to require the FTC to emulate the DOJ’s
current practice would be politically very difficult. Thus, the
recommendation with the best chance of success is to amend

bar would not preclude the FTC from pursuing an administrative complaint after the
consummation of a merger, based on evidence that the merger has had actual, as
opposed to predicted, anticompetitive effects.” Id.
235
Id. at 141-42.
236
Id. at 142.
237
Senator Barack Obama, Statement of Senator Barack Obama for the American
Antitrust Institute (2007), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/
files/aai-%20Presidential%20campaign%20-%20Obama%209-07_092720071759.pdf.
238
See Justin Blum, Intel Case May Signal Increased Antitrust Enforcement,
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 17, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&
sid=a4BNq.ad67N0; Stephen Labaton, Administration Plans to Strengthen Antitrust
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2009, at A1; Elizabeth Williamson & Matthew
Karnitschnig, U.S. Signals More Scrutiny of Mergers, Antitrust, WALL ST. J., May 12,
2009, at B1.
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the FTC Act to specify that the FTC be subject to the same
standard for the grant of a preliminary injunction as the DOJ.
CONCLUSION
To be effective, an enforcement system “must be clear,
fairly administered, and not unreasonably burdensome.”239
After Whole Foods, our dual antitrust enforcement system is
anything but that. There has been a running debate as to
whether the FTC and the DOJ face different standards for
obtaining a preliminary injunction, namely that the FTC
enjoys a lower preliminary injunction standard than the DOJ.240
The D.C. Circuit Court’s opinion in Whole Foods puts that
debate to rest in the D.C. Circuit with an empathetic “yes.”241
The FTC’s ability to commence administrative litigation,242
coupled with Whole Foods’ articulation of the preliminary
injunction standard for the FTC,243 create divergences between
the DOJ and the FTC. In a dual enforcement system, such
divergences undermine consistency, predictability, efficiency,
and fairness in the merger review process. More importantly,
such divergences make it clear that the ultimate decision as to
whether a transaction may proceed depends on which agency is
reviewing the transaction.
After Whole Foods, the arbitrary allocation of a
proposed transaction to either the FTC or the DOJ for review
can result in a very different substantive outcome for the
transaction. In a system of shared responsibility for
enforcement of the federal antitrust laws, such an outcome is
unacceptable. In such a system, merging parties should expect
comparable treatment and burden, as well as a comparable
outcome.244 Since a judicial solution is unlikely,245 and any
attempt to eliminate the FTC’s administrative litigation
authority is politically difficult,246 the most politically promising
solution to stem the growing divergence between the DOJ and
the FTC is for Congress to amend the FTC Act to specify that
the same preliminary injunction standard applies to both
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246

ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at iv.
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part I.A.3.
See supra Part III.A.
See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 131.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
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enforcement agencies. By doing so, Congress will ensure that
the costs of merger review do not overwhelm the benefits of a
fair and effective antitrust enforcement system.
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